First-person view drones, commonly known as FPV drones, have reshaped the nature of ground combat in ways few anticipated a decade ago. These small, agile machines, guided by operators through live video feeds, zip across battlefields at speeds up to 100 kilometres per hour. They carry explosives or reconnaissance gear, turning them into precision tools for strikes or intelligence gathering.
In Ukraine, where the conflict has served as a testing ground for such technology, FPV drones have inflicted heavy casualties on infantry and armoured units alike. Ukrainian forces report facing waves of these devices daily, often launched from concealed positions to target moving vehicles or exposed soldiers. The drones’ low cost, around a few hundred dollars each, allows even resource-strapped groups to deploy them in numbers that overwhelm defences. Operators sit safely kilometres away, steering them via remote controls that exploit gaps in electronic countermeasures. This asymmetry has forced militaries to rethink protection strategies, drawing from hard-learned experiences on the front lines.
Early responses to FPV threats centred on electronic warfare systems, which disrupt the radio signals guiding the drones. These setups emit jamming waves across specific frequencies, severing the link between drone and controller. In Ukraine, units equipped with portable jammers have managed to force many FPV drones to veer off course or crash harmlessly. For instance, during intense clashes in the Donbas region in 2023, Ukrainian troops used backpack jammers to create electronic bubbles around their positions, buying time to reposition or counterattack. However, these systems fall short in several ways. Jammers require constant power sources, often batteries that drain quickly in the field, leaving gaps during recharges. They also demand operators skilled in tuning frequencies to match the drone’s signal, a task complicated by the enemy’s habit of switching channels mid-flight. Reports from Ukrainian commanders in 2024 indicate that while jammers work against basic models, advanced FPV drones incorporate frequency-hopping technology, jumping between bands faster than many systems can adapt.
The situation grew more complex with the introduction of fiber-optic guided drones in early 2025. These variants replace radio links with thin cables that trail behind, rendering them immune to jamming. Ukrainian intelligence noted a surge in their use by Russian forces around Avdiivka, where the wires allow precise control without electronic signatures. Defending against them demands physical interruption of the cable, a near-impossible task for troops under fire. This evolution has left electronic warfare as a partial solution at best, effective against radio-dependent drones but helpless against wired alternatives. Frontline accounts describe frustration among soldiers who watch jammers fail as these new threats close in, highlighting the need for layered defences that go beyond signal disruption.
When electronic measures prove inadequate, physical barriers offer another line of protection for static positions. Ukrainian forces have turned to simple yet effective setups like fishing nets strung across trenches or vehicle roofs to snag incoming drones. These nets tangle propellers, causing crashes before payloads detonate. In urban areas around Kharkiv in 2024, troops draped camouflage netting over buildings to obscure movements from overhead surveillance. More robust structures, dubbed barbecues by soldiers for their grill-like appearance, involve metal grates welded over tank hatches or bunker entrances. These deflect drone strikes, allowing the blast to dissipate without penetrating. Underground tunnels and burrows provide deeper shelter, enabling resupply and rotations away from prying eyes. In the Zaporizhzhia sector, Ukrainian engineers dug extensive networks in 2023, moving ammunition and wounded personnel undetected. Such fortifications buy time but limit mobility, confining defenders to fixed spots while attackers probe for weaknesses.
Movement exposes troops to greater risk, as FPV drones excel at pursuing dynamic targets. Soldiers caught in the open have limited options: flee to cover, hide in terrain features, or engage the drone directly. Escape demands quick thinking, as drones can outpace running infantry. Hiding works in forested or rubble-strewn areas, where operators lose visual lock. Direct engagement has become more common, with troops using small arms to shoot down approaching threats. Assault rifles provide range but struggle against small, erratic targets. Ukrainian experiences show that rifles with collimator sights improve accuracy, allowing hits at 50 to 100 metres. However, their bulk and weight slow reactions, and malfunctions under stress add danger. A notable case from the 4th Special Operations Regiment in 2024 involved a soldier whose rifle jammed mid-engagement, forcing him to deflect the drone manually, a desperate act that underscores the unreliability of firearms in split-second scenarios.
Shotguns have emerged as a preferred choice for close-range defence. Their spread of pellets increases the odds of striking a drone’s fragile frame or propellers. Ukrainian units in the Kherson region reported success with 12-gauge models in 2024, downing FPV drones during river crossings. The weapon’s simplicity aids in high-pressure moments, requiring less aim precision than rifles. Yet, shotguns carry drawbacks too. Limited range confines their use to under 50 metres, and wind can scatter pellets. Specialised ammunition, like birdshot mixed with heavier loads, helps by balancing spread and penetration. Troops train to lead targets, accounting for drone speed, but effectiveness drops against armoured or fast variants.
Beyond firearms, innovative personal devices have entered the fray. Net guns fire expandable meshes to ensnare drones mid-flight. Ukrainian manufacturers like Ptashka Drones and Teneta have developed models tailored for infantry. The Ptashka, a reusable launcher, holds multiple cartridges for repeated shots, extending its utility in prolonged encounters. Teneta’s Mitla, disposable and lightweight at 300 grams, fits in pockets for quick draws. Both propel 3.5 by 3.5 metre nets up to 30 metres, tangling rotors to force crashes. Developers like Artur Shaginyan from Teneta stress their role as last-resort tools, giving soldiers an edge in one-on-one confrontations. Yevgeny Sukhinin of Ptashka Drones echoes this, noting that while risks exist, having the option beats facing drones unarmed.
One concern with nets involves potential detonation. Many FPV drones use contact fuses that trigger on impact, and a net might activate them prematurely. Ukrainian tests in February 2025 at training grounds used live drones to assess this, finding that while explosions occur occasionally, the distance often minimises harm. Despite scepticism from some troops, these devices have entered field trials, with units reporting successful interceptions during patrols.
Training forms the backbone of effective defence. Ukrainian forces introduced drone countermeasure modules into basic combined military training in November 2024. Recruits learn to spot threats early, use electronic warfare gear, and practise with shotguns or net guns. Scenarios simulate surveillance, strikes, and payload drops, building reflexes for real engagements. Instructors emphasise team dynamics, where one soldier spots the drone while others prepare countermeasures. Communication protocols ensure alerts spread quickly, allowing groups to scatter or counterfire in unison. Preparation extends to vehicle crews, who drill on evasive driving or mounting jammers during transit.
A comprehensive strategy integrates these elements. Detection radars or acoustic sensors provide early warnings, feeding into communication networks for coordinated responses. Electronic warfare disrupts initial approaches, physical barriers protect static assets, and personal weapons handle breakthroughs. Ukrainian commanders in 2025 stressed that no single tool suffices; success comes from layering defences. For example, in the Luhansk region, units combined jammers with shotgun teams, downing 70 percent of incoming FPV drones over a month.
Forces can draw from these experiences to counter similar threats. Insurgents in the Sahel or Somalia use commercial drones for attacks, mirroring Ukrainian patterns. Low-cost jammers and shotguns offer accessible starts, with training programmes adapting Ukraine’s modules. Regional cooperation could pool resources for advanced systems like radars. As drones proliferate, layered defences become essential to maintain operational freedom.
The evolution of FPV drones demands constant adaptation. Fiber-optic models evade jammers, requiring kinetic or visual countermeasures. Autonomous variants, guided by AI, resist signal disruption, pushing development of interceptors or EMP devices. Ukrainian innovations, from net guns to specialised ammo, show how grassroots efforts fill gaps when industrial solutions lag.
In practice, survival hinges on awareness and readiness. Soldiers who spot drones early and respond as trained stand better chances. Units with clear protocols distribute roles, ensuring no one faces threats alone. This team-based approach, honed in Ukraine’s trenches, translates to other battlefields where drones challenge conventional tactics.
Costs factor into choices. Shotguns run low, around a few hundred dollars with ammo at five dollars per round. Net guns cost more but save lives in critical moments. Jammers vary from portable units at thousands to vehicle-mounted at tens of thousands. Training investments pay off by multiplying effectiveness.
Environmental adaptations matter. In deserts, dust affects optics, favouring acoustic detection. Forests provide cover for hiding but limit shotgun range. Urban areas amplify risks from falling debris, making non-kinetic options preferable.
Future countermeasures might include drone-catching nets on vehicles or AI-assisted aiming for shotguns. In 2025, Ukrainian startups tested helmet-mounted displays that highlight incoming drones, aiding quick shots. These build on current tools, evolving defences as threats advance.
Militaries often with limited budgets, can prioritise training and low-tech solutions like shotguns while seeking partnerships for jammers. Across the globe, national forces facing enemy drones have adopted Ukrainian-inspired tactics, combining patrols with spotters and shooters. Similar adaptations could curb insurgent advantages.
The key takeaway from Ukraine involves treating drone defence as integral to operations, not an add-on. Units that drill regularly integrate countermeasures seamlessly, turning potential vulnerabilities into strengths. As conflicts globalise drone use, this proactive stance becomes crucial for maintaining battlefield control.
